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Abstract 
 
 
In this paper we study the recidivism behaviour of Finnish prisoners. We estimate a logistic 
regression model for Finnish convicts who were released from prison and followed for four 
years after their release. We find that the probability of recidivism reduces with age. This is 
true for both men and women, although for women the pattern is less clear. Empirical results 
did not support the specific deterrence effect hypothesis of imprisonment because the number 
of past prison sentences clearly increased the probability of recidivism, and furthermore, the 
duration of last prison spell seemed to have no effect on the probability of recidivism. 
However, this result is only suggestive. In order to make conclusive judgments on specific 
deterrence we would need a control group of offenders who were given an alternative 
punishment for a similar offence. 
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1   Introduction 
 
Imprisonment can reduce crime in three ways.1 First, for as long as the offenders are 
incarcerated they cannot commit crimes outside of prison.2 Second, imprisonment deters 
people from committing crimes. The deterrence effect can be divided into general and specific 
deterrence. General deterrence refers to the effect of sanctions on all potential offenders, 
whereas specific deterrence refers to the effect of a sanction on the punished. In other words, 
general deterrence is what deters the general public from committing offences and specific 
deterrence is what deters offenders from committing new offences. Third, individuals may be 
rehabilitated while in prison, e.g. through educational programs, which reduces the propensity 
to commit crimes. In this paper we concentrate on the specific deterrence effects of 
imprisonment. More precisely the aim of the paper is to study the effects of the number and 
duration of past prison sentences on the probability of recidivism of Finnish convicts.3
 
One of the main topics in economic analysis of crime is the attempt to determine the optimal 
type and level of criminal punishment, and detection probability. Usually, theoretical 
comparisons are made between monetary and non-monetary sanctions, e.g. fines and 
imprisonment. Because non-monetary sanctions are costly to impose compared to monetary 
sanctions, some economists argue that the optimal way to impose criminal sanctions is to use 
monetary sanctions up to the maximum wealth of the offender before non-monetary sanctions 
are used.4  
 
However, in many occasions monetary sanctions alone are not sufficient to deter criminal acts 
and therefore the use of non-monetary sanctions may be desirable. The most general reason 
for the use of non-monetary sanctions is that the offender’s wealth is too low compared to the 
level of a deterring sanction. In addition to the offender’s wealth constraint, a number of other 
reasons have been presented why non-monetary sanctions are used to deter crimes. First, non-
monetary sanctions, e.g. imprisonment, are needed to create marginal deterrence effects, i.e. 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Shavell (2004). 
2 Two conditions must be met in order for incarceration to reduce crime rates. First, criminals incapacitated by 
imprisonment must not be replaced immediately by new criminals and second, imprisonment must reduce the 
total number of crimes committed by repeated offenders over their criminal career. See e.g. Cooter and Ulen 
(2004), p. 494. 
3 Of course also detection probability is an important general and specific deterrent. However, in this study we 
are unable to control for differences in detection probability. 
4 See e.g. Polinsky and Shavell (1984) and also Becker’s (1968) seminal work on the subject. 
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incentives for offenders to commit less harmful acts.5 Second, non-monetary sanctions are 
used to restrict and prevent individuals from engaging in undesirable acts in a free society by 
(partly) removing them from it. The most familiar form of incapacitation is imprisonment, but 
also, community services restrict offenders’ freedom by involving some active contact with a 
penal agent. Third, non-monetary sanctions may create larger general and specific deterrence 
effects than pure monetary sanctions.  
 
Results from previous studies indicate that imprisonment seems to be a poor deterrent in the 
specific deterrence sense. Recidivism rates of those who were imprisoned are not that much 
lower than for those given a community sentence. On the other hand, longer prison sentences 
are not associated with lower recidivism. For example, Smith et al. (2002) concluded after 
analysing the effects of sanctions on recidivism in over a hundred studies that prison sanctions 
should not be used with the expectation of reducing criminal behaviour and that excessive use 
of incarceration may have substantial cost implications. However, even if imprisonment is not 
an effective specific deterrent the general deterrence effects of imprisonment may be 
sufficiently high for imprisonment to be socially optimal. For example, Levitt (1996) finds 
that the general deterrent impact of incarcerating one additional prisoner amounts to a 
reduction of approximately two violent crimes and 15 crimes overall per year. On the other 
hand, Tauchen et al. (1994) find that the general deterrence effects are strongest for 
individuals with limited previous contact with the justice system.6
 
One of the main findings in the literature of recidivism is that there are a small number of 
offenders who commit a large number of crimes.7 If the authorities were able to predict more 
precisely the individuals who are more likely to commit more crimes, a large number of 
crimes could be prevented more efficiently. Furthermore, more intensive rehabilitation 
programmes could be directed at offenders who are more likely to commit new crimes. 
 
Empirical results on deterrence effects of different sanctions are needed to help the courts in 
the selection of optimal type of punishment for the offender, and thus, to improve the 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Shavell (1985).  
6 In general, Levitt (1996) finds much stronger deterrence effects from prison population on crime rates 
compared to e.g. Tauchen et al. (1994).  Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) find that both labour and criminal justice 
strategies are important in deterring crime and that the effectiveness of law enforcement incentives has been 
greatly overstated.  
7 See Avio (1999) for a recent survey of the literature.  
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effectiveness of criminal policy.8 For example, according to the Penal Code of Finland, the 
courts can make a choice between conditional and unconditional imprisonment unless the 
seriousness of the offence, the guilt of the offender as manifest in the offence, or the criminal 
history of the offender requires the imposition of an unconditional sentence of imprisonment.9 
Similarly, courts can decide whether an offender who is sentenced to a fixed term of 
unconditional imprisonment of at most eight months shall be sentenced instead to community 
service, unless unconditional sentences of imprisonment, earlier community service orders or 
other weighty reasons are to be considered bars to the imposition of the community service 
order.10 In this light it is very important to have information on the specific deterrence effects 
of different sanctions. 
 
Although we are unable to make any comparisons of different sanctions with the data at hand 
we are to some extent able to study how the length of the most recent prison term and possible 
previous prison terms affect the probability of recidivism. Of course, because of the 
aforementioned handicap the results should be viewed as suggestive. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. In section 2 the data is described in more detail. Section 2 also presents 
the empirical model and variables used. In section 3 estimation results are presented and 
section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2   Data and empirical methods 
 
2.1 The data 
 
We use a random sample from a dataset collected from the Central Prisoner Register by the 
Finnish Criminal Sanction Agency. The data include information on newly released inmates 
who are then followed for a period of time. The collection period is from the beginning of 
1993 to the end of July 2004 and each released inmate was followed for a period of four 
years. Three outcomes are possible in this setting. First, the individual commits a crime 
during the follow-up and is sentenced back to prison. Second, the individual does not commit 
                                                 
8 See e.g. DiIulio (1996). 
9 The Penal Code of Finland, chapter 6, section 9. 
10 The Penal Code of Finland, chapter 6, section 11. 
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a crime during the follow-up.11 And finally, the individual does not commit a crime during the 
follow-up period, which is shorter than four years because the individual was released after 
January 2000 or the individual has died during the follow-up. The last cases refer to 
censoring. As a solution to the censoring problem we omit those individuals whose theoretical 
follow-up period would have been shorter than four years, i.e. we omit the individuals who 
were released after January 2000. Unfortunately, we have no data on mortality. After the 
omission the data includes about 2 000 individuals with almost 8 000 prison terms.  
 
The data include the following information on the individuals: age at the time of release, sex, 
length and number of all prison sentences and the respective year of release. Some data 
insufficiencies should be mentioned. In the data an individual is considered a recidivist even 
if the “new” crime was committed before the individual was sentenced to prison in the first 
place or the individual committed the crime while in prison, i.e. before release. For example, 
Hypén (2004) reports that in Finland almost 25 percent of all re-sentenced prisoners who were 
released in 1996 were sentenced to prison for crimes committed before the end of the initial 
prison sentence. This has to be taken into account when interpreting the results. Furthermore, 
the data do not include those individuals who are in remand imprisonment.  
 
However, most significant drawback of the current data is that there is only limited amount of 
information available of the individuals. The type of crime committed, alcohol or drug abuse 
may be important factors explaining the probability of recidivism. For example, drunken 
drivers are likely to exhibit different recidivism patterns than individuals committing property 
or violent crimes. However, the Central Prisoner Register data does not include these 
variables. These factors can be only partially controlled for with the information available to 
us at the moment. Thus, due to the lack of control variables for individual heterogeneity, the 
results should be interpreted with caution at this point. Fortunately, the Finnish Criminal 
Sanction Agency is collecting a new data set where more information is collected from the 
released convicts and it should at our disposal in the near future. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 More precisely, the individual does not go back to prison. The individual may commit a crime, but is not 
convicted, because the crime is undetected, some other sanction instead of imprisonment was chosen or the case 
is still in the criminal process. 
 5
2.2   Descriptive statistics 
 
Some descriptive statistics from the data are presented in Table 1. The number of prison terms 
in the data is 7 781 and the number persons who have served these prison terms is about 2 
000. This means that on average the individuals in the data have 4.5 sentences. The duration 
of the most recent sentence of the individuals was on average about 231 days. Those who 
were reconvicted during the follow-up period stayed out of prison on average for about 669 
days.  
 
All Men Women First-timers 2 to 4 5 or more
Number of prison terms 7 781 7 491 290 2 038 2 961 2 782
mber of prison terms per 
observation 4.5 4.5 3.0 1.0 2.8 8.7
verage age when released 34.0 34.0 33.9 31.4 31.8 38.3
varege last sentence (days) 231 231 243 237 209 248
Average spell between 
ences (days) 669 661 884 770 687 604
Nu
A
A
sent
Table 1. Descriptive statistics from the data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of sentences where the criminal was a woman is low: only 290 cases, a mere 3.7 
percent of all cases. Otherwise the descriptive profile for women is not much different than 
that of men. We also divided the cases into groups based on the number of prison sentences. 
First-timers are on average younger, serve shorter sentences and are out for a longer period 
before recidivism. About one third of the cases had five or more prison sentences. 
 
2.3   The model 
 
We model the probability of recidivism with a logistic regression model (the logit model). Let 
y denote a binary outcome variable denoting whether the individual is re-sentenced to prison, 
where  denotes a re-sentence, and 1y = 0y =  for those individuals who are not re-sentenced. 
Now, if we assume that the probability of recidivism follows the logistic distribution the 
conditional expectation of y can be written as 
 
 [ ] ( )| ,
1
i
ii i i
eE y x x
e
π
′
′= = +
x β
x β                    (1) 
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where x is a  vector of covariates and  is a 1n× β 1k ×  vector of parameters. The likelihood 
function for the data with n observations is  
 
                    (2) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1
1
1 ,ii
n yy
i i
i
L x xπ π −
=
= −∏β
 
and the log-likelihood can be written as  
 
 ( ) [
1
log ln ( ) (1 ) ln(1 ( )) .
n
i i i i
i
]L y x y xπ π
=
= + − −∑β                   (3) 
 
The estimates for the parameters are obtained by finding the values of β  that maximize the 
log-likelihood function. The results from the logistic regression model are interpreted using 
the so-called odds ratios (OR). Odds is defined as the ratio of the probability that the event of 
interest occurs to the probability that it does not, whereas odds ratio is a ratio of two odds. Let 
je  be a  vector where the j:s element is one and the rest are zeros. Now the odds ratio is 
defined as 
1k ×
 
 [ ]
( ) / 1 ( )
exp( ).
( ) / 1 ( ) j
OR
π π βπ π
⎡ ⎤+ − +⎣ ⎦= =−
i j i j
i i
x e x e
x x
                  (4) 
 
The numerator in (4) is the odds of an event occurring when there is a change from zero to 
one of one covariate when other covariates are controlled for. The interpretation of the odds 
ratio is as follows. If the OR equals one there is no change in the odds of the event occurring 
when there is a change in a covariate. On the other, hand if the OR is over (under) one the 
odds of the event occurring has increased (decreased), i.e. the probability that the event occurs 
has risen (fallen) compared to the probability that it does not. For example, when modelling 
recidivism with a logistic regression if we have a dummy variable indicating a woman inmate 
and the OR for the dummy is over one, we can say that women have a higher probability of 
recidivism compared to men when other covariates are controlled for.  
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3   Empirical results 
 
We estimated four different models according to how many years the individual was 
followed. This will give information on how the probability of recidivism changes as more 
time passes from the release. We also estimated separate models for men and women. The 
explanatory variables include age, number of prison sentences, the duration of the most recent 
sentence served and the point in time when the observation was released from prison. As 
mentioned earlier some possibly very important variables are left out. In our models the 
duration of the most recent prison sentence controls for some of the variation in crime type. 
Although the cases where the individual has committed several crimes complicate the 
interpretation, the duration of the most recent sentence can be seen as proxy for the severity of 
the crime or crimes committed. This of course undermines the strength of this variable as a 
measure for specific deterrence. The results for the model where the follow-up time is the 
maximum four years are presented in Table 2. Results for the models where the follow-up 
time is one, two and three years are in the Appendix in Tables A1–A3, respectively.  
 
First, we present some general remarks and review the model diagnostics. During the four 
year follow-up time about 55 percent of all male convicts are re-sentenced to prison. For 
women the percentage is lower at 46.8. The sensitivity of predictions describes the proportion 
of all re-sentenced prisoners who are correctly predicted to be reconvicted. In the model 
where the follow-up time is four years the percentage of correctly specified recidivists is 77.7 
for men and 60.2 for women. The specificity of predictions, on the other hand, is the 
proportion of all those who are not re-sentenced who are also predicted to be a non-recidivist 
by our models. The specificity measures are much lower compared to sensitivity for men 
whereas for women it is the other way around. The LR-test clearly rejects the hypothesis that 
all the covariate coefficients are zero in all model specifications. Furthermore, the Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test suggests a reasonable fit of our model despite the fact that 
potentially important covariates were not available.12
 
                                                 
12 The Hosmer-Lemeshow test can be used to test whether observed binary responses, y, conditional on a vector 
of covariates, x, are consistent with predictions. The test is based on a chi-squared statistic that compares the 
observed and expected cell frequencies in the 2*g table, as found by sorting the observations by predicted 
probabilities and forming g groups. For example, if g = 10 the subjects are divided into ten equal size groups and 
ordered according to the predicted probabilities so that the first group contains the subjects having the lowest 
estimated probabilities etc. See Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989, pp. 140–145) for more details. 
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          Table 2. Logistic regression results, follow-up time four years. 
 
Odds ratio P-value Odds ratio P-value
Age (years)a
   16–18 6.01 0.000 No observations
   19–21 2.43 0.000 8.33 0.077
   25–27 0.67 0.000 0.65 0.479
   28–30 0.50 0.000 1.42 0.551
   31–33 0.35 0.000 1.00 0.996
   34–36 0.35 0.000 0.56 0.356
   37–39 0.25 0.000 0.63 0.463
   40–42 0.21 0.000 0.24 0.032
   43–45 0.15 0.000 0.16 0.026
   46–48 0.12 0.000 0.25 0.073
   49–51 0.13 0.000 No observations
   52–54 0.11 0.000 No observations
   55–57 0.05 0.000 No observations
   58–60 0.08 0.000 No observations
Times in prisonb
   2–3 times 2.14 0.000 2.00 0.029
   4–6 times 3.82 0.000 4.89 0.000
   7–10 times 6.46 0.000 11.0 0.001
   11–19 times 11.8 0.000 13.2 0.001
   20 or more 21.5 0.000 No observations
Duration of last sentencec
   Less than 6 months 0.80 0.002 0.75 0.468
   12 to 24 months 1.01 0.935 0.61 0.344
   2 to 4 years 1.14 0.329 1.37 0.671
   over four 0.81 0.259 0.20 0.148
Year of released
1994 0.98 0.795 1.32 0.544
1995 0.91 0.294 0.80 0.648
1996 0.89 0.219 1.21 0.692
1997 1.20 0.059 1.33 0.556
1998 1.36 0.001 3.30 0.014
1999 1.54 0.000 3.43 0.027
Diagnostics men: Diagnostics women:
Number of obs. 7 491 Number of obs. 290
Percentage of recidivism 54.9 Percentage of recidivism 46.8
Log-L -4 507 Log-L -169
LR-test (p-value) 1 300 (0.000) LR-test (p-value) 55.3 (0.000)
Pseudo R 2 0.13 Pseudo R 2 0.14
Hosmer–Lemeshow (p-value) 9.35 (0.313) Hosmer–Lemeshow (p-value) 5.19 (0.737)
Sensitivity 77.7 Sensitivity 60.2
Specificity 55.7 Specificity 72.9
a Age-dummies, reference group are 22–24 
b Refecence group are first timers
c Reference 0.5–1 years
d Reference is 1993
Men Women
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For men there seems to be a clear reduction in the probability of recidivism as age increases. 
For women the effect of age is not so clear but there is a same tendency apparent. It is 
difficult to identify true age effects from the effects that correlate highly with age, such as 
wealth, income, risk aversion or family conditions. In order to clarify the age effects we plot 
the predicted probability of recidivism as a function of age with different follow-up periods. 
In Figure 1 the predicted probability of recidivism is depicted for men who are first-timers 
and whose most recent sentence was 6 to 12 months. 
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Figure 1. Probability of recidivism according to age, men. 
 
 
For example, after a four year follow-up time, almost 90 percent of 16 to 18 year old first-
time male offenders returned to prison at least once, whereas the recidivism rate of 49 to 51 
year old first-time male offenders was slightly less than 20 percent. The probability of 
recidivism clearly increases with the follow-up time for young men whereas in older age 
categories the differences are much smaller.  
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Figure 2 illustrates the same ambiguity in the age effect for women that was apparent in the 
model results in Table 2. However, after the age of 21 there is sharp a drop in recidivism. An 
interesting finding in Figure 2 is that there is no clear pattern how the follow-up period after 
one year affects the probability of recidivism of women. 
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Figure 2. Probability of recidivism according to age, women. 
 
 
The number of past prison sentences clearly increases the probability of recidivism. There are 
several possible reasons behind this phenomenon. First, stigma costs are greatly reduced as 
the number of prison sentences grows. This means that the consequences or costs of 
committing a crime are reduced. On the other hand, recidivism constitutes a basis to increase 
the severity of the punishment, which should, in theory, increase the deterrence effect. 
Second, opportunity cost, i.e. the expected utility from legal actions, of crimes reduces. For 
example, employment opportunities diminish after prison sentences. Third, it is sometimes 
argued that, in fact, criminals learn to be “better” criminals during the prison sentence, which 
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might increase their criminal activity after release. However, such experiences might also 
decrease the detection probability.  
 
In Figure 3 the predicted probability of recidivism for men is plotted against the frequency of 
prison sentences. The predicted probabilities are calculated for individuals at ages 22 to 24 
and for whom the duration of their most recent prison sentence was 6 to 12 months. After a 
four year follow-up period, about 60 percent of first time offenders returned to prison, while 
recidivism rate was well over 90 percent of those who have been in prison over 20 times 
before. The same tendency is apparent in Figure 3 as in Figure 1: there is very little difference 
between the follow-up periods of three and four years. 
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Figure 3. Probability of recidivism according to times in prison, men. 
 
 
The number of prison sentences seems to have a similar effect on the recidivism probability 
for women as can be seen from Figure 4. After a four year follow-up period, half of first time 
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offenders did not return to prison, while recidivism rate was about 90 percent for those who 
have been in prison for 7 to 10 times. 
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Figure 4. Probability of recidivism according to times in prison, women. 
 
 
The duration of the last prison spell seems to have no clear effect on the probability of 
recidivism. This is true for both men and women. For men those that have served less than six 
months have a lower probability of recidivism compared to the reference group, which has 
served six to twelve months. Of course, in order to truly capture specific deterrence effects we 
should compare the specific deterrence effect of imprisonment against specific deterrence 
effects from other criminal sanctions such as fines, community service and conditional 
imprisonment. 
 
A final note on the results is that for some reason the recidivism probability has risen in the 
late 1990’s. This is true for both men and women. The year of release dummy-variables may 
capture changes in the prison population in time. For example, the prisoners released in 1999 
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may have different criminal history in terms of crime type compared to those released in 
1994. However, with the data at hand we are unable and unwilling to make any conjecture on 
the reasons behind this phenomenon.  
 
 
4   Conclusions 
 
In this paper we concentrated on the recidivism behaviour of Finnish convicts. The aim of the 
paper was to study the effects of the number and duration of past prison sentences on the 
probability of recidivism. Empirical results did not support the specific deterrence effects of 
imprisonment. The number of past prison sentences clearly increased the probability of 
recidivism, and furthermore, lengthier prison spells were not associated with lower 
probability. On the contrary, those who served less than six months were less likely to go 
back to prison. However, the results should only be seen as suggestive because in order to 
truly capture specific deterrence effects one would need another punishment type as a 
benchmark against which imprisonment is compared. 
 
Due to the lack of relevant explanatory variables, most important of which is crime type, we 
conclude that suggestions on selective incapacitation programs should not be made according 
to our results. In order to make some recommendation we should observe a specific group 
whose recidivism probability is near unity.13 In the future, data from the Central Prisoner 
Register by the Finnish Criminal Sanction Agency should be improved by collecting more 
information on offenders, e.g. education, health, ability to work, drug or alcohol abuse and 
most importantly criminal history including crime type. Otherwise, it is very difficult to make 
any meaningful analysis of imprisonment. Furthermore, for some reason the recidivism 
probability has risen in the late 1990’s. Unfortunately, we are unable to make any conjecture 
on the reasons behind this phenomenon. This should be a fruitful topic for further research 
when better data come available. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See Schmidt and Witte (1987) for a discussion. 
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APPENDIX. Additional result tables. 
 
 
            Table A1. Logistic regression results, follow-up time one year. 
 
Odds ratio P-value Odds ratio P-value
Age (years)a
   16–18 6.82 0.000 No observations
   19–21 2.14 0.000 1.32 0.779
   25–27 0.63 0.000 0.69 0.607
   28–30 0.48 0.000 0.63 0.519
   31–33 0.33 0.000 0.16 0.029
   34–36 0.35 0.000 0.07 0.006
   37–39 0.25 0.000 0.13 0.022
   40–42 0.23 0.000 0.19 0.053
   43–45 0.15 0.000 0.05 0.020
   46–48 0.11 0.000 0.08 0.020
   49–51 0.13 0.000 No observations
   52–54 0.11 0.000 No observations
   55–57 0.03 0.000 No observations
   58–60 0.05 0.000 No observations
Times in prisonb
   2–3 times 1.90 0.000 1.35 0.525
   4–6 times 3.39 0.000 9.56 0.000
   7–10 times 5.90 0.000 13.2 0.002
   11–19 times 10.6 0.000 5.72 0.107
   20 or more 29.6 0.000 22.7 0.083
Duration of last sentencec
   Less than 6 months 1.07 0.368 0.31 0.013
   12 to 24 months 0.96 0.702 0.18 0.032
   2 to 4 years 0.87 0.379 0.16 0.127
   over four 0.91 0.686 0.22 0.236
Year of released
1994 0.89 0.434 0.81 0.748
1995 0.98 0.062 0.80 0.737
1996 0.88 0.359 0.99 0.983
1997 1.09 0.064 0.49 0.320
1998 1.19 0.435 0.83 0.780
1999 1.33 0.072 1.43 0.582
Diagnostics men: Diagnostics women:
Number of obs. 7 491 Number of obs. 290
Percentage of recidivism 25.4 Percentage of recidivism 15.5
Log-L -3 806 Log-L -103
LR-test (p-value) 878 (0.000) LR-test (p-value) 43.8 (0.012)
Pseudo R 2 0.10 Pseudo R 2 0.17
Hosmer–Lemeshow (p-value) 7.0 ( 0.537) Hosmer–Lemeshow (p-value) 8.3 ( 0.406)
Sensitivity 15.3 Sensitivity 13.3
Specificity 96.0 Specificity 98.8
a Age-dummies, reference group are 22–24 
b Refecence group are first timers
c Reference 0.5–1 years
d Reference is 1993
Men Women
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             Table A2. Logistic regression results, follow-up time two years. 
 
Odds ratio P-value Odds ratio P-value
Age (years)a
   16–18 4.59 0.000 No observations
   19–21 2.13 0.000 7.34 0.041
   25–27 0.60 0.000 0.82 0.755
   28–30 0.45 0.000 1.15 0.821
   31–33 0.34 0.000 0.86 0.810
   34–36 0.33 0.000 0.61 0.458
   37–39 0.21 0.000 0.57 0.397
   40–42 0.20 0.000 0.37 0.163
   43–45 0.14 0.000 0.17 0.054
   46–48 0.11 0.000 0.38 0.238
   49–51 0.10 0.000 No observations
   52–54 0.08 0.000 No observations
   55–57 0.05 0.000 No observations
   58–60 0.07 0.000 No observations
Times in prisonb
   2–3 times 2.15 0.000 2.45 0.008
   4–6 times 3.73 0.000 3.30 0.007
   7–10 times 6.48 0.000 23.4 0.000
   11–19 times 12.3 0.000 7.09 0.015
   20 or more 28.5 0.000 No observations
Duration of last sentencec
   Less than 6 months 0.87 0.048 0.61 0.281
   12 to 24 months 0.94 0.549 0.41 0.136
   2 to 4 years 1.07 0.602 0.55 0.118
   over four 0.82 0.280 0.06 0.004
Year of released
1994 0.89 0.152 1.41 0.482
1995 0.81 0.019 1.06 0.911
1996 0.79 0.011 1.28 0.627
1997 1.00 0.991 1.10 0.849
1998 1.03 0.762 2.13 0.130
1999 1.30 0.005 2.54 0.090
Diagnostics men: Diagnostics women:
Number of obs. 7 491 Number of obs. 290
Percentage of recidivism 43.0 Percentage of recidivism 33.5
Log-L -4 515 Log-L -158
LR-test (p-value) 1205 (0.000) LR-test (p-value) 46.1 (0.003)
Pseudo R 2 0.12 Pseudo R 2 0.13
Hosmer–Lemeshow (p-value) 8.33 (0.402) Hosmer–Lemeshow (p-value) 9.86 (0.275)
Sensitivity 55.6 Sensitivity 35.8
Specificity 76.0 Specificity 93.1
a Age-dummies, reference group are 22–24 
b Refecence group are first timers
c Reference 0.5–1 years
d Reference is 1993
Men Women
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             Table A3. . Logistic regression results, follow-up time three years. 
 
Odds ratio P-value Odds ratio P-value
Age (years)a
   16–18 5.46 0.000 No observations
   19–21 2.09 0.000 5.65 0.077
   25–27 0.62 0.000 0.91 0.881
   28–30 0.46 0.000 1.38 0.591
   31–33 0.34 0.000 1.47 0.527
   34–36 0.33 0.000 0.57 0.382
   37–39 0.23 0.000 0.79 0.717
   40–42 0.20 0.000 0.29 0.076
   43–45 0.14 0.000 0.11 0.015
   46–48 0.11 0.000 0.43 0.286
   49–51 0.11 0.000 No observations
   52–54 0.09 0.000 No observations
   55–57 0.05 0.000 No observations
   58–60 0.07 0.000 No observations
Times in prisonb
   2–3 times 2.06 0.000 2.55 0.004
   4–6 times 3.81 0.000 5.60 0.000
   7–10 times 6.51 0.000 21.4 0.000
   11–19 times 12.2 0.000 11.4 0.003
   20 or more 23.9 0.000 No observations
Duration of last sentencec
   Less than 6 months 0.84 0.014 0.70 0.358
   12 to 24 months 0.97 0.727 0.45 0.137
   2 to 4 years 1.10 0.479 1.08 0.917
   over four 0.85 0.372 0.05 0.037
Year of released
1994 0.93 0.354 1.19 0.703
1995 0.85 0.068 0.75 0.577
1996 0.87 0.118 0.80 0.643
1997 1.07 0.486 1.06 0.906
1998 1.27 0.012 1.89 0.188
199 1. 0. 2. 0
Dia Dia
9 47 000 66 .080
gnostics men: gnostics women:
Number of obs. 7 491 Number of obs. 290
Percentage of recidivism 50.8 Percentage of recidivism 41.5
Log-L -4 551 Log-L -164
LR-test (p-value) 1280 (0.000) LR-test (p-value) 58.0 (0.000)
Pseudo R 2 0.12 Pseudo R 2 0.15
Hosmer–Lemeshow (p-value) 13.7 (0.091) Hosmer–Lemeshow (p-value) 12.4 (0.133)
Sensitivity 73.0 Sensitivity 53.3
Specificity 61.0 Specificity 85.5
a Age-dummies, reference group are 22–24 
b Refecence group are first timers
c Reference 0.5–1 years
d Reference is 1993
Men Women
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
